Denial of the characteristic cognitivist thesis that moral sentences are used to express factual statements. Noncognitivists have proposed various alternative theories of meaning for moral sentences. In Language, Truth and Logic (1936), A. J. Ayer stated the emotivist thesis that moral sentences are not statements at all (see emotivism). In The Language of Morals (1952), Richard M. Hare (born 1919) agreed that in making moral judgments we are not primarily seeking to describe anything, but claimed that neither are we simply expressing our attitudes; instead, he suggested that moral judgments prescribethat is, are a form of imperative sentence (see prescriptivism).
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